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ABSTRACT
The turn of this new century has been witnessing the effort of various leading developed and developing
countries in their attempt to materialize next round of industrialization by emphasizing on innovations.
To potentially provide guidance to such national efforts, this paper explores the relationship between
technological innovation and industrialization and the importance of disruptive innovation in the
development of a nation’s international leadership. By employing the rigor of game theory, this work
first looks at key conditions under which an established market invites competition and innovation.
On top of such generally true results, it is consequently shown that technological innovation is a
driving force behind industrialization and that disruptive innovation can assist a nation to become an
international leader. Other than providing policy recommendations, this paper concludes with open
problems for future research.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
The recent development of artificial intelligence motivates several leading nations, such as the US,
Japan, France, England, and China, to embrace for the next round of industrialization. By referencing
to successes of past industrializations (Rostow, 1960; Forrest et al., 2018), these nations vigorously
pursue their goals by focusing on innovations, especially technological and disruptive ones. However,
main stream economics provides inconsistent conditions for industrialization to emerge (Forrest et al.,
2018). These current efforts of the leading nations and the inconsistencies of main stream economics
naturally motivate the investigation of the following natural questions: How are technological
innovation (TI) and industrialization related? And, how does disruptive innovation (DI) help a nation
become a global leader?
These are important practical and theoretical questions. In particular, to maintain their leadership
in the increasingly globalized world, developed nations introduce relevant policies and provide
necessary governmental supports to realize their goals (Hall & Pesenti, 2017; OSTP, 2012; Hermann
et al., 2016; Government of Japan, 2015; Marc et al., 2018). On the other hand, developing countries
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face the challenge of falling further behind the developed nations economically, socially, and
politically. Thus, they have to consider what to do to at least keep up with the current development
across the world (Forrest et al. 2018), while possibly providing their citizens with their longed life
styles (Rostow, 1960).
While similar questions have been considered in the past, conclusions have been mostly derived
using data- and anecdotes-based approaches (e.g., Nasution et al., 2018). Although stated as generallytrue results, these conclusions are definitely subject to the constraints of the employed approaches and
tend to be inconclusive or inconsistent (Rostow, 1960; Forrest et al., 2018). Because of such issues,
Rostow (1960) calls for the development of a reliable method and efficient way of thinking to produce
theoretically sound conclusions and practically useful recommendations. As an answer to this call
and a major contribution to the literature, this paper establishes generally-true results for scholars and
useful recommendations for nations to potentially lead the next round of industrialization. Because
of the employment of the rigor and logical thinking of game theory, conclusions developed herein
are not subject to the constraints of conventional data- and anecdotes-based approaches.
More specifically, this paper fills three gaps that exist in the literature. First, although there is
a large body of literature on innovation, scholars have measured this concept differently (Becheikh
et al., 2006). Such diversity in measurement has produced unreliable and inconsistent conclusions.
Second, numerous practical failures of modernization in the past century (Forrest et al., 2018) point
to the fact that the literature upon which those nations based their attempts did not truly capture
the essence behind how to kick start a self-sustaining momentum of economic growth; and it did
not fully grasp the systemic relationship between TIs and industrialization. Third, although various
scholars, e.g., Galli (2020), have investigated the influence of TI on efficiencies of various kinds and
revealed potential drivers of technological development and industrialization, our literature search
does not show studies regarding roles TIs/DIs play on a nation’s industrialization and development
of international leadership.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: After literature review, the market on which the
rest of the paper sits is studied in terms of how to normalize such variable factors as production costs,
customer reservation prices, economic entities’ boundary conditions, and magnitudes of loyal-customer
bases. The main results are developed regarding the relationship between TIs and industrialization, and
what great potential DIs can bring to a nation. In the conclusion, recommendations for government
policymakers and open questions for future research are provided.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The recent literature can be seen from different angles. Regarding TIs and improvement in efficiencies,
Arocena and Sutz (2018) call for alternatives by starting with sustainability based on the position
that development is no longer within any individual’s reach and that the prevailing knowledge and
innovation policies are socially exclusionary. Naudé and Nagler (2018) show that over the past three
decades it has become increasingly difficult for Germans to transform TIs into productivity growth
even with higher investment in R&D and personnel. Miao et al. (2018) show that TIs between
2000-2015 had a significant positive effect on the energy utilization efficiency of strategic emerging
industries and demonstrated a steady annual growth. Komkov and Kulakin (2018) analyze and assess
the scientific and technological development in Russia during 1997-2017. Focusing on the South
Asian experience, Singh (2019) finds that each industrial revolution has its own distinctive innovation,
and TIs not only change economic activities but also undergo dramatic changes in skill requirements.
Omamo et al. (2020) use Kenya as a case to show that intensifying social capital strengthens the
accelerator mechanism of the economy and creates larger multiplier effects, and can be achieved by
advancing education and R&D capacity.
Regarding what makes particular innovative technologies grow rapidly, Zhang et al. (2018) find
that policies in China, aimed at bolstering technologies, were the cause of the rapid growth in offshore
2
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wind power patents during 2006-2013. By analyzing Singapore’s globally competitive petrochemicals
industry, a case of quick development through vigorous interventions, Vu (2018) provides insights
into the debates about industrial policy and offers valuable lessons for developing countries. Kim and
Brown (2019) analyze the effect of energy-efficiency policies on lighting patenting between 19922007. Olivera (2018) discusses the industrial policy space and possibilities for industrial development
in peripheral countries by stressing the constraint imposed by the current system of rules that underly
international trades.
Regarding drivers of particular technologies and industrialization, Chen et al. (2018) introduce a
new paradigm of holistic innovation with its theoretical framework and policy implications based on a
review of typical eastern wisdom and best innovation practices. Mayer (2018) studies channels through
which mechanisms of digitization can boost industrialization in developing countries. Haraguchi et
al. (2019) find that successful industrialization is collectively driven by such factors as a country’s
initial economic conditions, factor endowments, demography and geography, and crucially supported
by variables that policymakers can control.
Concerning the growth of specific technologies and markets, Tiwari et al. (2018) provide a
recommendation for how to advance the commercial readiness of graphene-based products. Karlsen
(2018) documents how utility companies lead their value chains by introducing new organizational
principles to grow an immature sector. Du et al. (2018) find that China is becoming the main player
in plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) sales through comprehensively evaluating the evolution of China’s
PEV industry and technology. Nikabadi and Hakaki (2018) empirically study how open innovation
improves the performance of small and medium sized companies. Elharakany et al. (2018) claim
that for a nation to modernize, its higher education must meet the labor-market need by producing
adequate graduate output.
Enriching this empirical literature on TI and industrialization, this work employs game theory in
the name of market competitions to theoretically show two important results. First, TIs are a driving
force behind industrialization. Second, to become an international market leader, a nation needs to
concentrate its attention/effort on both domestic and foreign DIs.
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THIS RESEARCH
The economic market of concern is assumed to be closed, allowing free competition, where market
activities are not affected by environmental factors. It is occupied by m (= 1, 2, …) incumbent
regional economies, providing mutually substitutable offers. Each economy is constrained by its
respective boundary conditions; and the mutually-substitutable offers possess their individually
different features and functionalities. Each economy enjoys a base of loyal customers who only
purchase from their preferred economy if the price is no more than their reservation value. And,
there are also switchers in the marketplace whose purchases are influenced by whose price is more
competitive, forcing the regional economies to compete by adjusting prices. Additionally, assume
that these regional economies know each other’s pricing strategies and respond by playing the Nash
equilibrium through pure self-analysis.
To make our logical reasoning plausible, consider only such firms, established to satisfy a
particular market demand, that are financially sustained through positive cash flows generated from
meeting the demand. And the term ‘proposition,’ in this paper, means a statement that is arguably
true based on logical reasoning.
Varied Production Costs, Boundary Conditions and Customer Reservation Prices
Although available market offers are mutually substitutable, they still possess individually different
functionalities, backed by varied levels of services. For regional economy i , its price Pi satisfies

Ci ≤ Pi ≤ M i , where Ci is the production cost, M i the reservation price of loyal customers. Then
3
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based on the assumption of why a company exists, Pi  Ci   i  M i  Ci  , i  1, 2, , m , for

α i from the interval [0,1]. Instead of competing by using the absolute price Pi , the regional
economies compete by adjusting α i , i  1, 2, , m , to see who is more competitive.
some

Lemma 1. The afore-described regional economies compete with each other by adjusting

αi ,

0   i  1, i  1, 2, , m. If α i ’s are seen as normalized Pi , then the costs and reservation
prices of the regional economies are respectively normalized to 0 and 1.
In the following, selling price

Pi will be identified with α i . Without causing confusion, symbol

P will still represent price (= α i ). Additionally, each economy is limited by its unique constraints
due to the availability of resources, be they tangible or intangible (Harmancioglu et al., 2009), that
a business entity can employ in designing and implementing its strategies (Barney & Arikan, 2001).
For example, each regional economy has its unique set of beliefs, organizational culture, historical
tradition, industrial structure, patterns of capital flows, policy supports, etc. Such resource-based
view (Kozlenkova et al., 2014) implies that different economies possess different systems of available
resources, where each system is made up of a set of component resources and a set of particular
associations between the component resources. This defines resource heterogeneity, see Peteraf &
Barney (2003) for firm-level discussions. These differences in resource systems realistically persist
due to practical difficulties of trading resources and of connecting available resources in particular
ways. That is the so-called resource immobility; for firm-level discussions along this line see (Barney
& Hesterly, 2012). Performance deviations in regional economies stem from differences in available
resources, their associations, and levels of resource efficiency. For a systemic investigation of resourcebased phenomena, see (Forrest et al., 2020).
Symbolically, label the factors involved in the production and marketing of the market offers
by x1 , x2 , x3 , … Then, the previous paragraph implies that for regional economy i (





 1, 2, , m ), its magnitude N i x1 , x2 , x3 , of the base of loyal customers, reflecting how
available resources are organized acceptably both internally and externally, is constrained by its
lower Li  x1 , x2 , x3 , and upper boundary U i  x1 , x2 , x3 , :
Li  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   N i  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   U i  x1 , x2 , x3 ,  . Therefore, there is a unique
number β i in the interval [0,1] satisfying
N i  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   Li  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   i U i  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   Li  x1 , x2 , x3 ,   . The
result below follows.

Lemma 2. The lower and upper boundary conditions of the afore-described regional economies
can be normalized to 0 and 1, respectively, and the magnitudes of their loyal-customer bases
normalized to values between 0 and 1, inclusively.
In the following, the magnitude of regional economy i ’s loyal-customer base will be denoted

as

βi , and total number of switchers as β , satisfying 1   i 1i , 0  i ,   1 , i = 1, 2, …,

m.
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The Practicality of Pricing Strategies
Lemma 3. In the Nash equilibrium of the afore-described market, no pure pricing strategy exists for
the regional economies.
Proof. For any pure pricing strategy portfolio
satisfying
xi < x j , for j  1, 2, , m , j  i ,

 x1 , x2 ,, xm  , if a unique i  1, 2,, m exists

(1)
then regional economy i has successfully won over all switchers and can therefore raise its price
xi , but still satisfying equation (1), to bring in additional profits, while other regional economies

hold their strategies unchanged. So, the chosen portfolio

 x1 , x2 ,, xm  is not a Nash equilibrium.

If there are k regional economies that charge the lowest price, then these economies jointly
absorbed all switchers. When one of these economies lowers its price slightly, it creates additional
profits by attracting all switchers. So, the portfolio  x1 , x2 , , xm  is not a Nash equilibrium.

If k = m , then the previous discussion proves that in the Nash equilibrium, the market doesn’t
have any symmetric pure strategy portfolio.

Lemma 4. If all normalizations in Lemmas 1 and 2 apply, then in the Nash equilibrium, the magnitude
β k of the loyal-customer base and the price distribution Fk  P  of regional economy k satisfy

m
1  1  P   i 1i
Fk  P   1 
k 
P


 k
Fk 1  1andFk 
 k  
Proof. Regional economy
are



m
i 1,i  k

1

 m 1
 , k  1, 2, 3, 



(2)


  0.


(3)

k ’s profits from its loyal customers are β k P and those from switchers

1  Fi  P    P . So, regional economy k ’s objective function is

maxFk  P  E   k   




 P  
k

m
i 1,i  k



1  Fi  P    P dFk  P  ,

(4)

Π k is regional economy k ’s profits, E   k  expected profits, and economy k maximizes
its expected profits by selecting price distribution Fk  P  .
Regional economy k ’s equilibrium indifference condition is
where
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 k P   i 1,i  k 1  Fi  P    P   k , k  1, 2, 3, 
m

which implies: for

(5)

k  1, 2, , m,

1  F1  P    1  Fk 1  P   1  Fk 1  P    1  Fm  P    P   k 1  P 
Dividing the i th equation by the

1  Fj  P  
By letting

(6)

j th from equation (6), for i , j = 1, 2, …, m , i ≠ j , produces

i
1  Fi  P   .
j 

(7)

i =1 and j = 2, 3, 4, …, m , equation (7) leads to

1  Fj  P   1 1  F1  P   /  j , j  2, 3, , m.

(8)

Substituting equation (8) into equation (5) creates

 1  P  m 
 i 1 i
1 1  F1  P    
P


So, letting

1

 m 1
 .



(9)

i = k , j  1, 2, , m , and j ≠ k , produces

 1  P 
 i 1i
 k 1  Fk  P    
P


m






1
m 1

, k  1, 2, 3,  So, equation (2) follows. Regarding

equation (3), the first part can be verified directly. For the second part, because regional economy
k attempts to increase its profits by attracting switchers from the guaranteed level β k from its
loyal consumers by charging them the reservation value 1, the following holds
So,

P   k /   k    and the second part in equation (3) follows.

k P   P  k .

Corollary 1. In the Nash equilibrium, a symmetric mixed strategy exists in the afore-described market,
if and only if the magnitudes of the loyal-customer bases of the regional economies are the same.

1  Fi  P     j 1  Fj  P   , i, j  1, 2, , m .
So, Fi  P   F j  P  , if and only if  i   j , for , i, j  1, 2, , m .
Proof:Fromequation(2)orequation(9),  i
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Loyal-Customer Bases of Different Magnitudes
Lemma 5. If all parameters are normalized as in Lemmas 1 and 2, then in Nash equilibrium the
magnitudes of all loyal-customer bases are all equal.
Proof. Assume the opposite that let

 k  max 1 ,  2 ,   m 

(10)

k , 1 ≤ k ≤ m , and k0 , 1 ≤ k0 ≤ m , satisfy  k   k0 . From equation (4), regional
economy k ’s expected profits in Nash equilibrium are

for some

E k   


1

k
k  




 P  
k

m
j 1, j  k

 k dFk  P    k Fk  P 


°
°
°1
Ek ®
° Ek
°
°
¯



1  Fj  P    P dFk  P 
1

k
k  

.fromequation  5 

1
½
m 1
º
ª§
·
m
Ek
°
« ¨1 
¸  j 1E j » °
» ° , fromequation 2
« © Ek  E ¹
» ¾
«
EE k
» °
«
E
E

k
»¼ °
«¬
°
¿

The nature of loyal consumers implies

E k  



m


j 1, j  k j



1
m 1



  k    k  k ... k 

 
 m 1times 

on the assumption in equation (10),



 j 1, j k j
m





m
j 1, j z k

Ej

1
m 1

.

1
m 1

1
m 1

,

which is impossible, because based



   k  k ... k 

 
 m 1times 

1
m 1

 k ,

where for

every j  1,, 2, , m, j  k , j  k0 ,  j   k and  k0   k . So, the magnitudes of the
loyal-customer bases of the regional economies must all be equal.
Corollary 2. In the afore-described market, regional economy
the existing symmetric mixed strategy is

k ’s price distribution Fk  P  of

7
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1

 1  P    m 1
Fk  P   F  P   1  
 , k  1, 2, 3,  , where α is the constant
 P 
  
magnitude of a loyal-customer base satisfying F  P   1andF  P  
  0.
   
Proof. This result follows readily from Corollary 1 and Lemma 4.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE MAIN RESULTS
Since the time when Adam Smith (1776) first recognizes the importance of innovation in wealth
creation, a large body of knowledge on innovation has been created. However, that general knowledge
does not have a solid foundation, because the concept of innovation is understood differently from one
study to another (Becheikh et al. 2006). To avoid inconsistent empirical proxies of innovation, as is in
the literature, this section rigorously establishes two theorems on how regional economies compete
against each other, then investigates the association among innovation, TI and industrialization, and
what great potentials DIs can bring to an ambitious nation that desires to become a market leader.
How Regional Economies Compete With Each Other
Motivated by the universal desire for better living, the importance of industrialization, and how
technologies underlie each industrialization, many countries in the 20th century spent great amounts
of energy and immense efforts to industrialize themselves. They invested heavily and adopted
various policies, as suggested by development economics. They successfully attracted foreign direct
investments, employed most current technologies, and established manufacturing industries in major
cities and commercial centers (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). However, their longed industrialization
did not occur (Forrest, et al., 2018), although their rates of investment were high, and their GDP grew
tremendously within short periods of time before failing (Forrest et al., 2018). The reason of these
failures is that the referenced literature did not reveal the essence of how to kick-start and maintain
momentums of growth and did not grasp the systemic relationship between TIs and industrialization
(Forrest et al., 2018). To fill this gap in knowledge and to understand how different regional economies
compete against each other, we have:
Theorem 1. In Nash equilibrium of the afore-described market, if the market proportion of switchers
is greater than 0, then at least another regional economy will profitably enter this market with
its substitute offer, as a competitor of the incumbent economies, and the total expected profit of
all the entering economies will be directly proportional to β .
Proof. Based on all lemmas, assume that one new regional economy enters the said market by
uniformly randomizing its price P over the interval [0,1] (equivalently, the interval from the cost of
production to the expected maximum selling price) so that it expectedly makes profits and establishes
itself within the market.
To face the disruption of the established market order, each incumbent economy sets its price
by considering the price of the entrant and those of other incumbent economies. Equation (5) and
Lemma 4 imply that regional economy k ’s equilibrium indifference condition is

 k P   P 1  P   j 1, j  k 1  Fj  P     k or
m
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 P   P 1  P  1  F  P  

m 1

 ,

(11)

where α is the constant magnitude of any incumbent-economy’s loyal-customer base. Equation
(11) implies

  
F  P  1 

 P 

1
m 1

, which is defined when 1 

P   /  , because F  P   0 .

The entering-economy’s expected profits are




m

Ee        PdP     P 1  F  P   dP



(12)

1

Because
(12) as:

0 ≤ P ≤ 1 and F  P  has a mass point of size  /   m 1 at P = 1, rewrite equation

m
 
m 1
1
m



Ee         PdP    P 1  F  P   dP   
,
0

 

(13)

Because the expression within the braces is a real number, equation (13) implies that the entering
economy expects to make a profit that is positively proportional to the magnitude of switchers.
The following is a restatement of Theorem 1 with all normalizations from Lemmas 1-5 removed.
The omitted proof can be constructed according to that of Theorem 1 in Zhao et al. (2018). Note: This
result only talks about market competitions without addressing what the government is concerned
about, to this end, one example is (Aslani et al., 2018), where the macro-level complexity of the
natural gas energy system is studied, while showing how affordability, acceptability, and reliability
of energy supply are key concerns of the government.
Theorem 2. Assume that the market of concern consists of regional economies, as defined below, is
in Nash equilibrium. If the proportion of switchers is greater than the minimum proportion of the
loyal-customer bases of the incumbent economies, then another regional economy can profitably
enter the market with substitute offer, as a competitor of the incumbent economies. Additionally,
the expected profit of the entrant can be potentially as large as that of some incumbents. Here,
the market satisfies: (i) it is served by m incumbent regional economies with substitutable offers,
m = 1, 2, …; (ii) each incumbent economy enjoys the backing of loyal customers who only
purchase from their favorite economy if the price is not more than their reservation value; (iii) the
incumbent economies compete over those switchers who make purchases depending on whose
price is more competitive; and (iv) these incumbent economies are well aware of the pricing
strategies of each other and respond by playing the Nash equilibrium through pure self-analysis.
Relationship Between Technological Innovation and Industrialization
By innovation, it means a collection of one or several activities underlying the design and production
of one market offer or a bundle of offers that create exceptional value for an economic entity, such
as a firm or economy, when compared to other activities taking place simultaneously in the same
9
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market. Here, ‘one market offer’ represents an original creation that is of exceptionally added value
for the underlying economic entity. Hence, innovation means all necessary details for introducing
an offer, such as business model, operating processes, marketing efforts, etc. ‘A bundle of offers’
means packaging several offers into one deliverable package, where the underlying innovativeness
lies in the potential creation of simultaneous consumer utilities and multi-sided markets, for which
consumers are happy to bear higher prices than the market norm when the bundled offers are sold
separately. The stress on comparatively added value makes this definition of innovation include many
practical aspects, such as creativities of exceptional degree and quality, both internal and external
acceptance, adoption of appropriate operating processes for value creation and capture, inventions
and their conversion to actual products, etc.
A technological innovation (TI) represents an innovation (Welch, 2019) that emphasizes technology
as a source of innovation. So, when technology is a factor for increasing a firm’s competitiveness,
one deals with a TI. For example, as an incredibly complex system, a nuclear plant’s success depends
heavily on technology. Presently, such plants represent a common way to provide power. However,
for such a plant to drastically increase its market competitiveness, the management likely needs to
introduce necessary innovations on the underlying technology. This concept of TI reflects the business
consideration of creating and/or capturing value by working on technological aspects of market
offers. Creating and capturing value generally involve the combination, integration and interaction
of different technologies, on which other concepts, such as business models, management strategies,
etc., play their corresponding roles.
By industrialization, it means a period when an industry, more advanced than the extant ones,
is introduced to an economy on a large scale so that the accompanying social and economic changes
transform the consumers into an industrial society of a higher level. An extensive reorganization of
the economy occurs for the purpose of production and consumption of much improved quality. During
this period, the per-capita income tends to rise, and all types of markets either emerge or expand,
providing further stimuli for industrial investment and growth (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). The
most well-known and intensively-studied industrialization is the one of England, followed by those
of the United States and modern China (Forrest et al., 2018).
As for Theorem 2, its assumptions mean that each incumbent economy’s internal market is in
a state of mutual forbearance, where firms manufacturing the substitutable offers mitigate rivalry
by dividing the market in proportions to their strengths (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). Doing so
makes these firms yield dominance to stronger competitors in their less efficient market segments,
while exchanging the latter for the same in market areas where the former are more efficient. Such
codependence of domestic firms progressively persuades them to decrease their rivalry. Hence,
interfirm hostility declines gradually. That is, all manufacturing firms within an incumbent regional
economy in the greater market can be seen theoretically as one large aggregate company that competes
with other regional aggregate companies at the international level. Additionally, the assumptions
in Theorem 2 mean generally that the technology used in production and the pertinent business
operations have been standardized. Hence, for a regional economy to profitably enter such a market,
this economy will have to introduce a more efficient technology, and/or a more productive operation
system, and/or a more functional managerial routine, such as a business model, that significantly
reduce the overall expenditure in producing its market offer of increased sophistication, as partially
confirmed by Christensen et al. (1998).
For an offer to successfully meet market demand, it has to stay in tune with incessantly varying
consumer preferences. As described in Theorems 1 and 2, the consumer surplus of any market tends
to progressively expand unless the competing regional economies, incumbent or not, unceasingly
improve their offers. To accomplish this end, TIs will help either enhance an existing offer or
improve business efficiency. When one link of the adopted business process is enriched by a new
TI, the increased efficiency of that link will force other parts and links of the process to improve by
introducing relevant TIs. Over time, the collection of all relevant TIs, introduced at different times,
10
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will become a recognized industry, which produces the hard gears needed for implementing the TIs
in various productions. That is exactly what happened multiple times in modern history with each
round of industrial revolution. For example, when human labors were replaced by machines, industries
appeared promptly to make those machines. With a widening range of applications of those machines
industries also appeared to provide different forms of energies, to produce locomotives, to construct
necessary infrastructures, and to make needed raw materials, such as chemicals, etc. (Forrest et al.,
2018). Hence, TIs is a driving force behind the development of an industrialization. Summarizing
the discussions above, Theorems 1 and 2 obliquely imply:
Proposition 1. Technological innovations represent a driving force behind the appearance and
development of an industrialization.
Disruptive Innovations: Their Role in Leadership Development
By disruptive innovation (DI), it means an innovation that disrupts an existing market and value
system through creating a new market and new value network, with established business entities,
market offers, and business alliances displaced by new ones (Christensen, 1997). This definition of
DIs and Theorems 1 and 2, where “regional economy” is replaced by “enterprise” or “firm”, jointly
imply that DIs tend to come from non-market-leading companies, because these innovations generally
require a sufficiently long period of time to become profitable, if lucky. Within such a long period of
time, each DI requires additional R&D to become deliverable offers to the market and usable offers to
consumers; downstream infrastructures might also need to be constructed for the imagined products
to eventually reach end users. Most critically, a consumer market of sufficient depth and magnitude
needs to be formed. Hence, market-leading companies cannot afford in terms of time, finance and
market rivalry to spend their resources away from their sustaining activities that are necessary to stave
off competitors from encroaching on their current market positions (Christensen, 1997).
Now, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that when a market of sufficient depth and magnitude emerges,
one or more established economic entities will likely enter this new market. These entrants expect to
collectively make as much expected profit as the incumbent supplier whose loyal-customer base is
of the minimum magnitude. And if the market expands quickly, these entrants expect to potentially
make more than any of the early entrants and the initial market creators. And, once such a new product
market emerges, it penetrates and creates great shocks on all or many other established markets
(Assink, 2006). This also encourages economic entities of the established markets to migrate into
the emerging market.
Relevant to this discussion, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) propose the concept of first mover
advantage (FMA). They show how extra time over later entrants allows for first or early movers to
capture customers and build capabilities so that they can advance and perpetuate early gains. At the
same time, other studies suggest (e.g., Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013, and references listed therein)
that time can also benefit later entrants by helping them to improve risk estimations, clear uncertainties,
improve capability gaps, and facilitate learning from the costly mistakes of earlier entrants. The
dilemma that the same logic that explains why first movers achieve better outcomes is also applicable
for explicating why later entrants enjoy advantages over first movers is mainly caused by missing
data, where records of failed first movers are not well recorded and therefore mostly unavailable.
To resolve this dilemma, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that market leaders are generally later entrants to
emerging markets. In other words, established business entities are generally not early movers of any
newly emerging market until some first movers have demonstrated the existence and depth of the
market. This result theoretically confirms the empirical finding (e.g., Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010)
that early followers are more successful than pioneers because long-term survival and performance
depend on the ability to acquire and leverage resources and capabilities for large-scale production of

11

International Journal of System Dynamics Applications
Volume 10 • Issue 4 • October-December 2021

products. Summarizing this discussion, we have established the following conclusion. That, in turn,
shows the importance of DIs in economic development.
Proposition 2. For a nation to potentially become a market leader quickly in the international arena,
the nation needs to concentrate its attention and effort on disruptive innovations, be they created
locally or come from abroad.
This conclusion follows from Theorems 1 and 2. Specifically, identify an ambitious nation, as
a large, multi-business entity, which desires to become a market leader as one of the new entrants
in these Theorems, while other nations that are already in the marketplace as the incumbents. Then,
when some DIs demonstrate their market validity, the ambitious nation’s attention and efforts spent on
these innovations will quickly turn into coordination and deployment of resources and complementary
capabilities to scale up its operation. The timely action can assist the nation in bypassing other nations,
be they first movers in the new market or leaders of established markets.
By emerging and rising alongside the expanding market, such a nation will conveniently become
a leader in the relevant international arena. As for whether or not there is a need for intellectual
property protection in order for this conclusion to hold true, the anecdotal-based research of McGrath
(2013) on competitive advantages and the game-theory-based work of Zhao et al. (2018) on trade
dumping and anti-dumping demonstrate that such protection is not needed due to the reasons that all
competitive advantages have become transient and that antidumping measures simply do not work
in a globalizing market. For partial, empirical confirmations relevant to this proposition, see, for
example, Markides and Geroski (2005).
CONCLUSION
By employing the rigor and logical thinking of game theory, this paper explores the relationship
between TIs and industrialization by addressing an academically and practically significant question
of how DIs can assist a nation to become a global leader. It contributes to the literature by establishing
the following general results, although some aspects of them were previously conjectured empirically
by various scholars (see the sections above for related references): (i) by treating the interaction among
business entities as a game, conditions under which an established market calls for innovation and
competition are established. (ii) TIs drive the appearance and development of industrialization. And,
(iii) DIs can assist a nation to become a market leader internationally.
In terms of managerial recommendations, because the method of reasoning used in this paper is
not subject to the constraints of empirical analysis, the established conclusions in the previous sections
provide government officials and policymakers with dependable bases to make their decisions. In
particular, the following general recommendations become available for the government of a nation:
(i) it needs to adopt policies that inspire its citizens to innovate. If successful, the nation will motivate
its manufacturing sector to constantly interpret market signals (Theorems 1 and 2). Consequent
innovations will surely help direct entrepreneurial efforts productively (Naudé & Nagler, 2018) and
further the development of human capital (Arocena & Sutz, 2018). (ii) It needs to carefully follow
up the development of DIs, implement relevant policies and provide necessary supports, such as,
for example, those needed for alternatively powered vehicles (Du et al., 2018), and those needed
for utilizing modern technologies for effective farming in even extremely difficult environmental
conditions as conventionally seen (Snyder et al., 2020), if the nation does not want to fall behind the
global development (Proposition 2). As pointed out by Forrest et al. (2018), government supports are
necessary for the formation of large-scale coordination, construction of infrastructure, development
of markets of sufficient depth, etc.
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Regarding limitations, all conclusions established above are developed on the assumption of
why a business firm exists – it attempts to satisfy a particular market demand through generating
enough profits from its market offers. In real life, although this assumption used to be generally true
(Sobel, 1999), it can be questioned within the current business landscape. For example, in recent
years quite a few companies have been very successful by focusing on painting bright futures instead
of generating positive cash flows from the marketplace. By doing so, they uninterruptedly pull in
sufficient amounts of venture capital to support their operations (Li & Ma, 2015). So, by altering this
assumption in one way or another, all the results derived in this paper need to be revisited in order
to develop their corresponding versions. That represents opportunities for future research that will
provide useful guidelines for current business operations.
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